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COMMENTARY: TOWARD A THEORY OF FAIR
DISTRIBUTION
Herma Hill Kay*
It is a real honor for me to participate in this timely and
important Symposium on Equitable Distribution in New York.
As an active participant in the no-fault divorce reform efforts
that began nearly thirty years ago in California and are still con-
tinuing there and elsewhere throughout the country, I have wit-
nessed most of the major changes in the legal framework sur-
rounding marriage and divorce that have taken place during that
period. I can therefore assure you, if assurance is needed, that
Professor Garrison's study of the effect of New York's Equitable
Distribution Law on divorce outcomes is one of the most com-
prehensive and most significant appraisals of the impact of a di-
vorce law on the divorcing population that has yet been under-
taken. Not only does her study differ from earlier studies by
providing solid comparative data between the financial outcome
of divorces before and after the effective date of the new law,
but also it provides ample and detailed data concerning the dis-
position of specific assets and the determination of support obli-
gations in both periods that will enable the legislators and other
policymakers of this state to assess the current situation as a
prelude to determining what the next steps on the ongoing path
to divorce reform in New York should be. All of us who work in
this field, but particularly the people of New York, are indebted
to Professor Garrison for this remarkable achievement.
While all of Professor Garrison's findings deserve the most
careful attention of New York's policymakers, I will focus my
remarks on two of them, both counterintuitive. First, the 1980
decision to abandon title as the basis for property disposition
and to put in its place an equitable distribution law-designed
in part to benefit wives by making more property available for
distribution according to a fairer standard-has had virtually no
effect in most cases, essentially because of the meager amounts
of property available for distribution. And in those cases involv-
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ing couples who do have substantial assets to divide, the new law
has not materially improved the situation of wives. Second, re-
lated changes in the alimony laws have reduced the amount and
duration of maintenance awards. Based on the first of these
findings, Professor Garrison concludes that further debate over
the definition of property and the standard for its distribution
will have little practical impact on most divorcing couples, but
she recognizes that greater clarity in the standard for property
distribution could be beneficial to needy wives of high income
husbands. In response to the second finding, she calls for re-
newed emphasis on the post-divorce allocation of income.
I am not yet ready to concede that further analysis of the
definition of marital property and the standard for its divi-
sion-equitable distribution vs. equal division-is unprofitable.
Rather, I think that Professor Garrison's findings provide the
basis for a more informed discussion of those matters than was
possible before the 1980 law was enacted. For one thing, the in-
terplay she has demonstrated between the property and mainte-
nance reforms suggests that a desirable balance has not yet been
achieved. For another, the effort to achieve clarity and coher-
ence in the law is always worthwhile, even if some segments of
the population will be more directly affected by those efforts
than others.
As my contribution to that enterprise, I would like to offer a
few comments about the concept of fairness in marital dissolu-
tion cases. In particular, I will argue that we need to construct a
theory of what constitutes fairness in the financial distribution
at divorce and that such a theory cannot be developed indepen-
dently of our notions of what constitutes fairness during mar-
riage. In developing this argument, I propose first to examine
separately each of the three common aspects of the typical fi-
nancial distribution: property division, spousal support, and
child support, and then to see how they might fit together in a
coherent theory. Finally, I will respond to some of Professor
Garrison's very promising suggestions for future reform.
I. WHAT CONSTITUTES FAIRNESS?
A. Property Distribution
As everyone knows, California was the first state to abolish
all of the traditional fault-based grounds for divorce and to sub-
[Vol. 57: 75
FAIR DISTRIBUTION
stitute in their place a factual finding of marriage breakdown.1
The California no-fault divorce law became effective in 1970 in
the context of a community property marital regime, in which
the husband and wife held "present, existing and equal inter-
ests" 2 in their common property during the marriage. If the mar-
riage was dissolved by the death of either spouse, the survivor
was recognized as the owner of one-half of the community prop-
erty, while the decedent could exercise testamentary power over
the other half.3 In the absence of a contrary testamentary dispo-
sition, the decedent's half interest went to the surviving spouse."
By 1975, partly in response to the theme of equality between the
spouses sounded by legislators and judges interpreting the no-
fault divorce law,5 managerial control of the community prop-
erty had been shifted from the husband to "either spouse."
I As I have pointed out elsewhere, the California legislature did not thereby adopt
the "pure" no-fault divorce law that had been recommended by the California Gover-
nor's Commission on the Family, for the legislature's statement of the no-fault ground,
"irreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the mar-
riage," focuses on the conflict between the parties, and its further definition of irreconcil-
able differences as those grounds which are determined by the court to be substantial
reasons for not continuing the marriage and which make it appear that the marriage
should be dissolved, implicitly recognizes the relevance of fault. Herma H. Kay, Equality
and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. Ci. L
Rlv. 1, 41 (1987) (quoting 1969 Family Law Act § 8 (codified at CAL. CiM. CODE § 4506
(West 1983))).
2 CAL. CiV. CODE § 5105 (West 1983) ("The respective interests of the husband and
wife in community property during continuance of the marriage relation are present,
existing and equal interests under the management and control of the husband .... ")
The legislature deleted the original phrase "under the management and control of the
husband" in 1973; the change became effective January 1, 1975. Act of Oct. 1, 1973, ch.
987, §4, 1973 Cal. Stat. 1897.
- Ch. 312, §4, 1970 Cal. Stat. 708 (repealed 1983).
" Id. If the wife died first, her testamentary dispositions were subject to the hus-
band's debts, and he retained managerial power over the entire community except to the
extent necessary to carry her will into effect. Ci. 281, §202, 1931 Cal. Stat. 596 (repealed
1983). The wife did not enjoy similar powers over the husband's testamentary disposi-
tions. But see note 6 infra for subsequent developments.
I See Herma H. Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CA1.
L. REv. 291, 301-03 (1987).
6 Act of Oct. 1, ch. 987, § 14, 1973 Cal. Stat. 1897, amended by Act of Sept. 23, 1974,
ch. 1206, § 4, 1974 Cal. Stat 2609 (codified at CAL- CIv. CODE §§ 5105, 5110, 5113.5, 5122,
5123, 5125, 5127, 5131, 5132 (West 1991)). See also note 2 supra. In addition, Probate
Code § 203 was amended to permit a wife to take community property without adminis-
tration upon the death of her husband, unless he willed property to a third party, in
which case administration was necessary. Ch. 11, § 2, 1974 Cal. Stat. 18 (amended by ch.
752, § 5, 1974 Cal. Stat. 1662; Act effective June 30, 1975, ch. 173, § 2, 1975 Cal. Stat. 318
(codified at CAL. PROB. CODE § 203 (%Vest 1991); Ch. 11, § 5, 1974 Cal. Stat. 18 (amended
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Given this clear recognition of the equal ownership of com-
munity property during marriage and its equal distribution upon
death, one might well ask why an unequal division was thought
proper upon divorce prior to the enactment of the no-fault di-
vorce law. In fact, the first California legislature provided in
1850 for an equal division of community property upon divorce,
although the legislators did not get around to specifying the
grounds for divorce until the following year.8 Unequal division of
community property was introduced in 1857 limited to the fault-
based grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty: the court was
directed to allow the party "found guilty" of these matrimonial
offenses only such portion of the common property as it found
"just."9 The legislature removed the statutory reference to the
"guilty" party in the 1873-74 Amendments to the Civil Code,
providing in less condemnatory tones that in granting divorces
on the grounds of adultery or extreme cruelty, "the community
property shall be assigned to the respective parties in such pro-
portions as the Court, from all the facts of the case, and the
condition of the parties, may deem just."10 This statutory pat-
tern persisted until the legislature abolished all of the fault-
based grounds for divorce in 1970, and as an essential compo-
by ch. 752, § 7, 1974 Cal. Stat. 1662; Act effective June 30, 1975, ch. 173, § 4, 1975 Cal.
Stat. 318 (codified at CAL. PROB. CODE § 204 (West 1991)).
Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 12, 1850 Cal. Stat. 255.
8 Act of March 25, 1851, ch. 20, § 4, 1851 Cal. Stat. 186. Professor Barbara Arm-
strong criticized this pre-Code divorce statute as "unscientific," since it made no distinc-
tion between divorce and annulnent, but instead "provided for divorce based on grounds
in existence at the time of the marriage which indicated a lack of real consent to the
marriage because of fraud, force or being under the age at which consent could be given
(all properly bases for annulment), as well as on grounds which were marital misconduct
that occured thereafter." 1 BARBARA N. ARMSTRONO, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 129 (1953).
' Act of April 14, 1857, ch. 176, § 1, 1857 Cal. Stat. 199. (The new proviso to the
equal division requirement stated in part that the party "found guilty" of adultery or
extreme cruelty "shall only be entitled to such portion of the common property as the
court granting the decree may in its discretion, from the facts of the case, deem just, and
allow.") This statutory reference to the "guilty" party was carried over to the first Civil
Code of 1872. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 148 (1872) ("When the decree of divorce is rendered
on the ground of adultery or extreme cruelty, the party found guilty thereof is only enti-
tled to such portion of the common property as the court granting the decree may, in its
discretion, from the facts of the case, deem just.").
" 1873-74 Amendments to the Code, ch. 612, § 33, 1874 Cal. Stat. 191. When the
legislature added incurable insanity as a ground for divorce in 1941, it also permitted
unequal division of the community property in divorces granted on that basis. Ch. 951,
§§ 2-3, 1941 Cal. Stat. 2547.
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nent of that no-fault reform, reenacted the equal division rule."
The point of this perhaps overly simplistic reading of the
legislative history of the California equal division requirement is
to suggest that a property theory of co-ownership supporting
equal division of community assets lies ready to hand in a com-
munity property state. This theory is not unlike the sole owner-
ship theory that was once invoked in New York to support dis-
tribution according to title."2 Moreover, in a community
property state, equal division of assets on divorce is consistent
with equal power to dispose of assets upon death. The disposi-
tion of the marital estate is thus the same in principle regardless
of whether the marriage terminates by divorce or death. 3
" CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)(1)-(2) (West 1983). The equal division requirement con-
tained in this section was subject to two exceptions: the existence of economic circum-
stances justifying the award of an asset to one party under conditions that would pro-
duce a "substantially equal division" and the existence of financial misconduct resulting
in one party's deliberate misappropriation of assets.
2 I thus quibble mildly with Professor Garrison's statement to the effect that "equi-
table distribution is similar to community property, under which a spouse without legal
title also has rights to marital property." Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry:
The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BRoo.
L. REV. 621, 628 (1991). This statement is accurate only if one understands that, in a
community property system during the existence of the marriage, title to a community
asset held in the sole name of the spouse managing the asset is not an indication of sole
ownership.
13 Six of the original eight U.S. community property states either mandate equal
division at divorce or presume that the property division will be substantially equal un-
less another disposition is shown to be warranted. The three equal division states are
California (CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(a) (West 1991 & 1991 Supp.); Louisiana (LA. Rcv. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2801(4) (West 1991)); New Mexico (Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 97 N.M. 133, 135,
637 P.2d 564, 566 (1981) (citing Mitchelson v. Mitchelson, 186 N.M. 107, 520 P.2d 263
(1974))). The three presumptively equal states are: Arizona (Pangburn v. Pangburn, 152
Ariz. 227, 731 P.2d 122 (Ct. App. 1986)); Texas (Welch v. Welch, 694 S.W.2d 374 (Ct.
App. 1985)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 32-712(1)(a) (1983 & 1991 Supp.)). The two remaining
states, Nevada and Washington, have enacted equitable distribution statutes. See NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 125.150(1)(b) (Michie 1987); WASH. Rsv. CODE ANm § 26.09.030 (West
1986 & 1991 Supp.). One of these two states, Washington, divides both community and
separate property and has expressly rejected equal division in principle. See Marriage of
Tower, 55 Wash. App. 697, 700, 780 P.2d 863, 865 (1989), review denied, 114 Wash. 2d
1002, 788 P.2d 1077 (1990) (observing that "[a] property distribution need not be equal
to be 'just and equitable' "). The drafters of the Uniform Marital Property Act made no
recommendation as to how property should be divided upon dissolution, merely observ-
ing that "a distribution different from an equal one in a dissolution of spouses owning
marital property would simply be a property division dealing with the existing property
rights of the spouses in marital property and reaching a particular result to achieve an
equitable distribution of the marital property." UNt. MnrrA.L PROP. ACT (UMPA) § 17,
9A U.L.A. 137 (1987). Wisconsin, the only state to adopt UMPA, presumes an equal
division of marital property but permits the court to alter the distribution after consider-
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By contrast, no theoretical justification supporting an equal
division of property at divorce flows easily from a common law
marital regime based on a separation of interests. If a retrospec-
tive equal sharing principle is adopted to become operative upon
divorce or separation, one must ask why the marriage should be-
come a financial partnership only when it terminates in divorce
rather than death. If an equitable distribution principle is cho-
sen, as New York's experience painfully attests, difficult choices
attend both the determination of what property will be subject
to distribution and what factors should be taken into account in
making the distribution. If the divorce court is simply directed
to make a "just" distribution, the legislature has done nothing
more than toss the issue to the judges.
This analysis suggests that the real problem with the New
York law governing the property rights of married persons is not
so much its lack of coherence in disposing of assets upon di-
vorce, but rather its failure to recognize a sharing principle dur-
ing the marriage. In my view, a marital regime that treats each
spouse as a separate entity whose primary obligation to the
other during marriage is limited to the (typically unenforceable)
provision of essential support, and that refuses to acknowledge
the contributions of both spouses to the acquisitions of either is
inconsistent with the widely held concept of marriage as a part-
nership and with the societal ideal of equality between women
and men. I continue to believe that common law states should
consider adopting a marital property system that initiates a
sharing principle at the inception of the marriage and that pro-
vides for equal management of the common property.14 The
Uniform Marital Property Act15 is the place to begin that con-
sideration. Wisconsin was the first common law state to enact a
version of the Uniform Act;1 6 Professor Mary Moers Wenig, in
ing a specified list of factors. Wis. STAT. §767.255 (1985-86).
" Herma H. Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 31 (Stephen D. Sugarman and Herma R. Kay eds., 1990).
' UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT §§ 1-26, 9A U.L.A. 103-45 (1987). See also William A.
Reppy, The Uniform Marital Property Act: Some Suggested Revisions for a Basically
Sound Act, 21 Hous. L. REv. 679 (1984).
"0 Act effective Jan. 1, 1986, 1983 Wis. Laws 1158 (amended by 1985 Wis. Laws 574)
(codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 766.001-97 (1985-86 & Supp. 1991). See generally June M.
Weisberger, The Wisconsin Marital Property Act: Highlights of the Wisconsin Experi-
ence in Developing a Model for Comprehensive Common Law Property Reform, 1 Wis.
Wom. J.L. 5 (1985).
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the context of a comprehensive analysis of Connecticut's marital
property law, has strongly recommended that her state follow
suit.17 New York should undertake this project as well.
In the course of that project, the New York legislature
might wish to consider whether to characterize professional de-
grees and licenses as marital property. The New York Court of
Appeals believed it was following legislative direction when it
characterized a medical license as marital property under the
Equitable Distribution Law in O'Brien v. O'Brien.'8 But the
court's discussion suggests that it did not accept the license as
an item of property apart from the requirement to include a sum
representing its value in the pool of assets available for distribu-
tion. Thus, Judge Simons tellingly remarked, "Those things ac-
quired during marriage and subject to distribution have been
classified as 'marital property' although, as one commentator has
observed, they hardly fall within the traditional property con-
cepts because there is no common law property interest remotely
resembling marital property.""' If the New York legislature de-
cides to abandon the common law system of property holding
between husbands and wives in favor of a marital regime based
on community property concepts, it will have to reconsider
traditional property notions. In a community property system,
one result of defining a professional license as property is that
its characterization as community or separate will depend on
whether it was acquired before or after marriage. Income earned
by a spouse after marriage is community property; but if the de-
gree, obtained before marriage, is separate property, the post-
marital income reflects both the separate capital and the com-
munity labor, thus reducing the size of the community estate.
Perhaps in part for this reason, no community property state
has so far defined a professional degree or license as property.
B. Spousal Support
Alimony (to use the old term) and property distribution
17 Mary M. Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present and
Future, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 807.
10 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
19 66 N.Y.2d at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (quoting Florescue,
"Market Value," Professional Licenses and Marital Property: A Dilemma in Search of
a Horn, N.YST. B. Ass'N. FANL L Rv., Dec. 1982, at 13.
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were traditionally linked, both in negotiated divorce settlements
and in court-ordered awards. One reason for this linkage was
that property distribution alone was and is almost always inade-
quate to enable both spouses to recover from the immediate fi-
nancial upheaval that usually accompanies divorce, and to ad-
just to the economic realities of their separate post-divorce lives.
This was clearly true in title jurisdictions like pre-1980 New
York, where in some cases alimony may have provided the only
tool for transferring resources from one spouse to the other. In
many states, however, the flexibility afforded by a modifiable
support order may have been thought necessary to provide a
safeguard against the inability of the parties or the court to an-
ticipate future needs and unknown circumstances. When the ali-
mony order was both permanent (until remarriage of the sup-
ported party or death of the supporting party) and modifiable,
therefore, it seemed to offer a measure of future security for the
dependent spouse.
This conventional view of the alimony award has not sur-
vived the changing roles of women and men either in marriage
or in the society at large. Its demise, however, is not the inexora-
ble (if unintended) by-product of the wife's loss of bargaining
power occasioned by the no-fault divorce revolution, as some re-
searchers have claimed.20 Rather, as Professor Garrison has con-
vincingly demonstrated, the size and duration of such awards
can be dramatically reduced in the wake of reforms in the finan-
cial entitlement rules without any change whatsoever in the
grounds for divorce.2 1 As she has pointed out, the 1980 New
York statute created a formal linkage between equitable distri-
bution and maintenance awards. One reason for doing so ap-
pears to have been the belief that the need for maintenance
would be reduced as the pool of property available for distribu-
tion increased. Acting on that belief, the New York reformers
chose to limit permanent maintenance to long-married wives
and to those who are unemployed or who have sacrificed their
own career opportunities in order to function as homemakers
20 See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED So-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 26-28 (1985).
2, See Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Re-
sults, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 14, at 90-95.
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and primary caretakers during the marriage.22 In other cases, the
legislature provided for rehabilitative alimony to encourage
working wives capable of self-support and those from shorter
marriages to become self-sufficient. Given the reformers' as-
sumptions about how the equitable distribution law would func-
tion, their decisions about maintenance were not unreasonable.
Professor Garrison's research, however, has exposed these
assumptions as false hopes. She found that the reformers did
succeed in dramatically reducing both the frequency and dura-
tion of alimony awards: the proportion of cases in which alimony
was awarded declined by forty-three percent in all three survey
counties, and the majority of awards were for a limited dura-
tion.23 The value of the alimony that was awarded, however, did
not decline significantly.24
As Professor Garrison properly observes, whether the re-
sults she reports are acceptable depends on what we want the
law to achieve.25 The development of a modern theoretical basis
for post-divorce payments, not justified as a transfer of marital
property, between formerly married persons is no easy task.
Professors June Carbone and Margaret Brinig, reviewing some
of my own earlier work, characterize my position as that of a
"liberal feminist" who seeks to "dismantle the gendered division
of labor within the family" by removing the legal framework
that encourages women to remain economically dependent upon
their husbands.2e They claim that my analysis, "tlaken to its
logical conclusion ... suggests that the appropriate response to
women's dependence on their husbands' incomes is less, not
more, financial support upon divorce. ' 27 The logic of their cri-
tique implies that, if I am consistent, I should applaud the fi-
nancial outcomes that Garrison reports from New York.
This is not the appropriate place for a full response to this
critique. I would like, however, to make one point that seems
relevant in light of the New York data. As Professors Carbone
and Brinig recognize, I distinguish between the present and the
Garrison, supra note 12, at 698-99.
Id. at 697-99.
"Id. at 712 (Table 49).
"Id. at 725.
"June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology,
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL L Pav. 953, 992-96 (1991).
27 Id. at 994.
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future in speaking of legal recognition at divorce of the financial
consequences of women's choices of traditional family roles 28
While I did not specify when I thought the "short run" (during
which women need to be protected against these unfortunate fi-
nancial consequences) would end and the "long run" (when the
law should not "encourage future couples entering marriage to
make choices that will be economically disabling for women,
thereby perpetuating their traditional dependence upon men
and contributing to their inequality with men at divorce ' 2 )
might begin, it seems clear enough that the future has not yet
arrived, at least in New York. Thus, I would like to reassure
Carbone and Brinig that I do not believe we have yet come to
the historical moment when I would conclude that there is no
need to use "lost career opportunity analysis" to justify compen-
sating "modern women who forego promising career prospects to
care for children" upon divorce.3 0 Before that moment arrives, I
believe we as a society must have firmly in place a much more
elaborate institutional structure of available child care and
health care services, as well as adequate social and economic
support systems to enable parents to nurture and rear their chil-
dren.3 1 Moreover, we must have greater confidence than now
seems possible that the existing job discrimination against
women workers, particularly those with children, can be ended.
My colleague, Professor Steve Sugarman, has properly ques-
tioned the tacit assumption of some commentators that the fi-
nancial distribution at divorce should endeavor to compensate
for the inequities of the paid labor market which consistently
values the work done by men higher than that done by women.2
I do not disagree with his observation, but I would join Profes-
sors Deborah Rhode and Martha Minow in their call for a
broader and more unified approach to the problems created by
family breakdown. 3 These observations should make clear that I
28 Id. at 994 n.183, 995 n.188.
29 Kay, supra note 1, at 80.
" Carbone & Brinig, supra note 26, at 995 n.188.
3' Kay, supra note 1, at 89. I have made a similar point in discussing Ira Eliman's
modern reconceptualization of alimony. See Kay, supra note 14, at 34.
32 Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIvoRCa RE-
FORM, supra note 14, at 152.
13 Deborah Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Re-
forms, in DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 14, at 191-210.
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envision a long and arduous period of fundamental social change
before women can fairly be held fully responsible for the finan-
cial consequences of their choices concerning intimate relation-
ships and childrearing. Until those changes are well underway,
and their success assured, we should make haste slowly in our
willingness to deprive women and children of necessary financial
support at divorce.
C. Child Support
In contrast to property distribution and spousal support,
the theoretical basis for child support appears relatively clear.
The legal bond between parents and their children is not termi-
nated by divorce; at the least, whatever support obligations are
imposed on parents in intact families should survive the family
breakup. The difficult theoretical questions attend such matters
as whether the law should impose a greater obligation on di-
vorced parents to provide post-minority support for items like
college expenses than exist for children in intact families be-
cause of the danger that children of divorce will not enjoy the
continued affection of the noncustodial parent who may grow
less involved with them and less interested in their future devel-
opment. In addition, the apportionment of scarce financial re-
sources between children born to first marriages as against those
born to subsequent unions remains a controversial question of
public policy.3 4
Professor Garrison's findings document a twenty-five per-
cent decline in the value of child support awards between 1978
and 1984, an outcome not chargeable directly to the Equitable
Distribution Law since no change was made there in the child
support obligation. As she notes, the New York data showing a
decline in child support awards are similar to those reported
elsewhere. Her response to the financial impact of -divorce on
children is to endorse Professor Mary Ann Glendon's call for a
"children first" principle that would prefer the needs and inter-
ests of children to those of their parents. It is not clear to me
whether Professor Garrison endorses Professor Glendon's view
3' See Rebecca B. Garland, Second Children Second Best? Equal Protection for
Successive Fdmilies Under State Child Support Guidelines, 18 HASTINGS CoN.sr. L Q.
881 (1991).
Garrison, supra note 12, at 727.
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that would distinguish between the principled distribution of
"marital" property in a childless marriage and "family" property
in a marriage with dependent children. I have observed else-
where that while I take Glendon's point that the separate theo-
retical aspects of a dissolution settlement (property distribution,
child custody, spousal support and child support) cannot be sep-
arated in practice, I do not believe that we should abandon the
effort to justify independently each aspect of the financial
award. 36
II. GARRISON'S PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER REFORM
I have thus far suggested that New York should consider
adopting a marital property regime that features a sharing prin-
ciple during the marriage, rather than postponing such a concept
until dissolution, and that would contain provision for equal
management of the common property by both spouses. A prop-
erty theory justifying an equal division of marital property at
dissolution flows easily from such a regime, and is consistent
with the distribution of marital property upon death. Further, I
have argued that, given the continued impediments to women's
equality with men in the paid labor force and the society at
large, spousal support will remain a necessary ingredient of the
financial package for most women for some time to come. Fi-
nally, I agree with Garrison and Glendon that we must bend
every effort, consistent with fairness to the divorcing parties, to
protect children against economic harm resulting from family
disintegration. How do these comments compare to *Garrison's
proposals for future reform in New York?
I am struck immediately by the relatively close fit between
some of Garrison's proposals and the steps taken in California
both in the original Family Law Act of 1969 and more recently
as part of the second wave of divorce reform that I have dis-
cussed elsewhere."' Thus, legislation providing for the deferred
sale of the family home in specified cases, revised in 1988 to be
more widely available, is in place.38 If community debts exceed
total community and quasi-community assets, the equal division
3' Kay, supra note 5, at 317-18, discussing Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform
in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1559-60 (1984).
11 See Kay, supra note 14, at 18-28.
38 CAL. CIv. CODE § 4700.10 (West Supp. 1991).
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requirement does not apply.3 9 Although California does not ex-
empt estates with relatively low value from the equal division
requirement, if the net value is less than $5,000, and one spouse
cannot be located with reasonable diligence, the court is empow-
ered to award the entire estate to the other spouse on specified
conditions.4 0 The legislature revised the statute governing the
award of spousal support in 1988, making the standard of living
established during the marriage the overarching factor among
the list of relevant circumstances to be considered.4 ' The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had earlier indicated that permanent
awards should be the norm in marriages of long duration.42
California's reputation for innovation in family law matters
is more welcome in some parts of the country than others. I like
to think that my state's influence has been, on the whole, a pro-
gressive one. At any event, our legislature has shown itself open
to reform, and willing to reexamine its earlier enactments in re-
sponse to constructive criticism. I expect no less of New York.
39 Id. § 4800(c)(2).
40 Id. § 4800(b)(3).
" Id. § 4801.
42 In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139, 573 P.2d 41 (1978).
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